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Introduction 
 In December of 2007, recession struck the United States.  Although the 
recession was spawned by an American financial crisis, and first affected the United States, it 
quickly became an international concern.  In 2009, the International Monetary Fund identified 
the economic decline to be a global recession and noted “the global economy is experiencing its 
greatest downturn in 50 years.” (International Monetary Fund, 2009) 
In the opening month of the recession American employment peaked at nearly 94.3 
million.  The unemployment rate, which had held steady at 4.7 percent for the three months 
prior, rose to 5.  The recession lasted into June 2009. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012)  
Yet the worst employment situation it spanned are found in its closing months.  The highest 
recession unemployment occurred in June 2009, the recession’s final month, at 9.5 percent.  
Yet the lowest number of employed Americans in this year and a half was 89.5 million, seen in 
March of 2009, accounting for a loss of 4.8 million, or one in every twenty jobs present at the 
recession’s start. 
The end of the recession did not see an immediate, or as of yet even eventual return to 
normalcy.  After June 2009, the unemployment rate continued to climb, and the number of 
employed Americans continued to fall.  Unemployment peaked at 10 percent in October 2010, a 
full four months into the “recovery”, and employment count continued to sink, hitting its low the 
following January, at 87.8 million jobs.  From the recession’s beginning to the employment low 
in January 2010, U.S. employment had fallen 6.8 percent, or 6.5 million jobs.  
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Figure 1 
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey 
 
Figure 2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey 
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Currently, the United States has surpassed its pre-recession number of employed 
residents.  The preliminary data for December 2013, the most recent available claims 96.9 
million employed.  This defines a 2.8 percent or 2.6 million job increase since December 2007.  
Yet more residents are searching for work, and the job market has become more competitive.  
This is evidenced by the failure of the unemployment rate to sink to pre-recession levels.  While 
the share of the American labor pool still in search of work has been declining steadily, from 7.9 
percent at the start of 2013, December still saw a 6.7 percent unemployment rating, a full two 
points above the previously held 4.7.  The result, that America is still in the midst of the period of 
recovery following the Great Recession, is quite alarming considering the date of the 
recession’s close, some fifty-four months ago. 
In a 2013 poll conducted by Gallup, on the 5th-8th of September, 21% of Americans who 
were asked the question “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country 
today?” responded that jobs and unemployment were the most pressing issue in America 
(Gallup).  How to recover the jobs lost in the recession is a point of contention in the American 
political process, and is a concern present in the mind of many citizens on Election Day. 
The question of employment is inseparable from how America conducts itself politically.  
In modern America, legislators’ actions are often swayed by pressure to make more abundant 
and more lucrative employment available to their constituents.  In turn, speculation as to how a 
candidate will affect the local, state, or federal job market is often a factor in a voter’s decision.  
Polls by the PEW Research Center found that a vast majority of voters, 80 percent in the 2008 
elections, and 83 percent in 2012, rated the employment issue as “very important” to deciding 
their vote.  Another poll taken in September of 2012 showed that the issue was “very important” 
to 74 percent of swing voters (Pew Research Center for the People and Press, 2012).   
With job creation occupying such a critical role in our political structure, it’s important that 
the electorate be informed on the issue, in order to more effectively improve the job market 
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through choice of candidate.  To begin to understand how to aid the job creation, this discussion 
examines the sources of net job creation, and how their work might be accelerated.  It takes the 
position that the solution lies in repeated introduction of new firms as a method of outfitting the 
American economy with the innovation it requires to remain competitive.  Specifically, it 
recognizes that new firms represent the largest source of net job creation present in the 
American economy in recent decades. 
  
6 
 
Data 
The Business Dynamics Statistics 
This discussion, recognizing the statistical significance of net job creation in young firms, 
requires a dataset that allows for the examination of how employment and other indicators vary 
with the bodies of firms grouped by age of the member firms.  This need has been met best by 
the relatively young Business Dynamics Statistics database, published by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  The Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) is “compiled from the Longitudinal Business 
Database (LBD). The LBD is a longitudinal database of business establishments and firms 
covering the years between 1976 and 2011.” (U.S. Census Bureau)  Data in the BDS is 
available from 1977 to 2011. 
What is available through the BDS? 
The BDS dataset allows for the examination of a number of indicators of the business 
environment in the United States, such as number of firms, number of establishment (physical 
business locations), employment count, and various employment dynamics such as the number 
of jobs created, the number of jobs destroyed, and the corresponding net job creation, which 
serve as important figures to the discussion. 
The BDS also allows for examining these indicators across a number of divisions such 
as firm age, firm size, and nine of ten 2-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classfication) industry 
divisions.  All data, for all divisions, is listed for each individual year, from 1977 to 2011. 
 BDS Data Used 
  With the focus of the portions of this discussion that use the BDS being startups and 
young firms, the firm age tables bear the most relevance, and are referenced most frequently.  
Twelve distinct firm age categories are present in the Firm Age tables of the Census Bureau’s 
7 
 
Business Dynamics Statistics, each representing the number of years for which a firm has 
existed on the indicated year’s annual collection date for the dataset, March 12th. 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6-10 
 11-15 
 16-20 
 26+ 
 LEFT CENSORED 
The “LEFT CENSORED” category serves as just another age category, having no 
pertinence to censorship of classified or otherwise sensitive information.  As the dataset from 
which the BDS is derived, the LBD, only starts its coverage at 1976, the Census can only verify 
the ages of those firmed established after the starting date of the LBD.  As such, the only 
categories displaying the presence of any firms in 1977 are the “0” and “LEFT CENSORED” 
fields, where “LEFT CENSORED” houses all firms that were one year or older in age on the 
annual data collection date, March 12th, in 1977. 
 To limit the scope of the examination, some fields offered by the BDS, and relationships 
between certain fields, were not examined.  The information that concerns this discussion most 
is that which describes job creation in firms, survivability in firms.  Also of concern is the number 
of jobs created in surviving firms at a number of stages in their development.  The fields 
referenced in this discussion are: 
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 “Year”, indicating the year to which data corresponds 
 “Firm Age”, indicating the firm age category to which data corresponds 
 “Firm Size”, indicating the firm size (in employees), to which the data 
corresponds. 
 “Firms”, which holds a count of firms in a given year and category 
 “Emp”, which holds a total count of employment in a given year and category 
 “Job_Creation”, the absolute number of jobs created in a given category between 
year   and    . 
 “Job_Destruction”, the absolute number of jobs created in a given category 
between year   and      
 “Net_Job_Creation", net jobs gained in a in a given category between year   and 
    (the difference between “Job_Creation” and “Job_Destruction”) 
 “Firmdeath_Firms”, the number of firms that ceased existing in a given category 
between years   and    .  Deaths of firms that would have been in another 
category in year   than they were in year     contribute to the deaths of the 
category to which they would have belonged in year  . 
 “Firmdeath_Emp”, employment lost in firms that ceased existing in a given 
category between years   and    .  Deaths of firms that would have been in 
another category in year   than they were in year     contribute to the deaths of 
the category to which they would have belonged in year  . 
Other data displayed in course of the discussion may be derived from these values.   
 Limitations of the BDS dataset 
 Perhaps the greatest need for descriptions of the data used in this discussion arises 
from imperfect measures used due to limitations in the data itself.  Described in this section are 
why, in portions of this discussion, certain categories were chosen or omitted. It also describes 
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why certain time samples were chosen, and to illustrate that such decisions were both 
deliberate, and appropriate given the nature of the data available. 
  What Industries and Employees are Included? 
 The Census Bureau defines what industries and individuals are counted in the Business 
Dynamics Statistics. 
 Those firms included in the dataset are those in identified to be in the following industries 
(U.S. Census Bureau). 
 Agricultural Services, Forestry, and Fishing  
 Mining 
 Construction 
 Manufacturing 
 Transportation and Public Utilities 
 Wholesale Trade 
 Retail Trade 
 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
 Services 
The Census Bureau lists the following industries and individuals as not being among 
those counted in the BDS (U.S. Census Bureau): 
 Self–employed 
 Domestic service workers 
 Railroad employees 
 Agricultural production workers 
 Most government employees 
 Employees on ocean–borne vessels 
 Employees in foreign countries 
10 
 
The Firm Age Tables and Sampling Difficulties 
Economic conditions are far from static, and figures and effects detailed in any single 
year, or any poorly chosen sample, could lead to inaccurate analysis or fail to reflect reality.  
Internet, growing interconnection between markets around the world, and other changes in the 
economic environment through technology and regional or global policies and conditions make 
the world of 1977 a different one from that of 2011.  Risk of the presence of a substantial 
change in the business environment, grows with the time sample for which the data is observed.  
Such changes could alter trends in various indicators, biasing results, possibly rendering 
conclusions invalid.  Similarly, sampling too small a sample, or poorly selecting elements of a 
sample could allow conclusions to be drawn that are true of the sample, but would be incorrect if 
applied more generally. 
 Sampling of the Firm Age tables is further restricted, as not all age categories are 
present for all years.  As mentioned above, in 1977, firms only existed in two age categories: 
“0”, and “LEFT CENSORED”.  This is significant, as startups can be averaged from the years 
1977-2011 to obtain a typical number of startups in the United States at a given time.  However, 
if one were to attempt to find the typical number of two year old firms in the U.S. for a given time 
by averaging over the same sample, one would arrive at a lower number than would be 
accurate, as 1977 and 1978 both record zero firms two years of age.  This is not to suggest that 
no firms two years of age exist, yet because their birth would be prior to March 12th, 1976, they 
contribute to the “LEFT CENSORED” figures.  This discrepancy can be hard to reconcile, if one 
wants to display similar, yet well sampled information for all age categories, as some age 
categories have only had member firms in very recent years,  
 Firms of age “0” and “LEFT CENSORED” are first counted in 1977 
 Firms of age “1” are first counted in 1978 
 Firms of age “2” are first counted in 1979 
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 Firms of age “3” are first counted in 1980 
 Firms of age “4” are first counted in 1981 
 Firms off age “5” are first counted in 1982 
 Firms of ages “6-10” are first counted in 1983 
 Firms of ages “11-15” are first counted in 1988 
 Firms of ages “16-20” are first counted in 1993 
 Firms of ages “21-25” are first counted in 1998 
 Firms of ages “26+” are first counted in 2003 
Thus, to be able to display average values for firm count, employment, and net job creation 
across all firm age categories, with consistent time samples, one could only sample from 2003-
2011 to avoid the averages being reduced by zeroes, prior to the year which firms first qualify 
for a category.  This is a 27 years in which data is lost.  For indicators involving firm deaths, data 
does not exist for the “26+” category until 2004.  This time sample, 2003-2011, covering a single 
cycle of economic expansion and contraction, while not ideal, would be workable if these were 
the only practical restrictions on time samples in all age categories.  
 
Figure 3 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics 
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Not all firm age ranges are full at all times.  While startup data may be sampled from its 
first appearance in the BDS, 1977, without statistical inconsistencies, the same is not true for all 
age categories.  Figure 3 shows the number of firms in the “21-25” firm age category, in each 
year from 1998 (the first year firms appear in this category) to 2011.  While the number of firms 
eventually settles between 30,000-40,000, it is less than 10,000 in 1998.  From there it appears 
to climb linearly until it finally corrects by 2002.  This is because before 2002, this firm age 
category has not yet achieved a sort of steady state, where it contains firms of all ages that it 
claims to, and firms are aging out of the category.  The first year, 1998, is just twenty-one years 
after the first startups were recorded in the dataset.  Therefore, no twenty-two year old firms 
appear outside of the “LEFT CENSORED” category, and the “21-25” age category only holds 
firms that are 21 years of age.  Thus, while firms age into the age category, none are old 
enough to age into the next one, and the only loss in firms is attributable to firm death.  The 
number of firms does not correct until five years later, when the category first holds firms that 
are twenty-five years of age.  All firm age categories that contain a range of ages (or for which a 
firm can be categorized in more than one year) a period of instability in number of firms and 
other indicators, usually exhibited as a growth period as no firms are old enough to age out of 
the category, only in. 
 Categories “0”, “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, and “5” need no time to reach steady state, as all 
firms that are displayed in one of these categories one year have either 
advanced a firm age category or died by the next.  
 Category “6-10” achieves steady state in 1987 
 Category “11-15” achieves steady state in 1992 
 Category “16-20” achieves steady state in 1997 
 Category “21-25” is first full in 2003 
13 
 
Most trends and averages established for these firm age categories that incorporate date from 
before a steady state is achieved will be biased by the growth period. 
The categories “26+” and “LEFT CENSORED” further complicate the sampling issue, as 
these categories remain 
unstable.  As a result of 
how they are defined, 
they will remain so 
indefinitely.   
For the time 
being, the “26+’ category 
is the oldest of the 
numbered age ranges.  
As such, firms may 
never age out, making any true steady state, such as those seen by the other categories 
impossible.  Figure 4 suggests the pool of firms over twenty-six years of age, at least for most of 
the past decade, to be continuously increasing in a linear fashion.  It is likely that as it fills with 
older firms and accounts for a greater share of all firms a different steady state will manifest.  As 
firms aging out can never account for any firm loss in this category, the rate of firms aging into 
the “26+” category must be offset by firm deaths.  It is more likely that, in the future, the “26+” 
category will be replaced by a “26-30” and a “30+” category.  Until then, however, the number of 
firms in the “26+” category will continue to climb, along with other indicators, making any reliable 
time-independent trends or averages relying on categorical stability impossible for this portion of 
the economy. 
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Source:  U.S. Census, BDS, Firm Age Tables 
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The “LEFT CENSORED” category also displays instability, but of an opposite nature.  As 
this category contains only those firms predating the first startups that appear in 1977.  No new 
firms may enter this category.  As such, this category is doomed to an extended atrophy, and 
may only achieve a steady state if all such firms die.  Until this happens time independent trends 
cannot be reached by averaging an indicator over any time sample, similar to the “26+” 
category.  
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Firm Dynamics 
 Much of the analysis on this subject has focused on sector and business size.  There is 
surely some value to these discussions.  In 2011, firms with fewer than 500 employees 
accounted for 49% of total employment in the United States1, and certain sectors expand while 
others contract.  No perfect set of sources for job creation has yet been discovered and utilized, 
so our discourse can only hope for more accurate analysis, at least for the moment.  The 
Business Dynamics Statistics published by the Census Bureau is helpful in the examination of 
the role of brand new firms and the growth they exhibit in subsequent years as an important 
source of jobs in the American economy. 
Startups 
The process of firm creation plays a critical role in keeping the American economy afloat.  
The modern United States is riddled with tremendous national or even international firms.  A 
number of industries are run by oligopolies of household names, such as Apple and Microsoft, 
which together produce the operating systems for 94.3% of devices that used the internet in 
December of 2013, with 80.3% produced by Microsoft alone2.  Goliath firms such as these may 
appear to be immovable.  But the picture painted by Timothy Bates appears to favor David 
instead: “Faced with competitive threats rooted in changing circumstances, decisions are based 
upon strategies rooted in the past” (Bates, 2008). 
The innovation required to engage these changing circumstances is often found in new 
firms.  These new firms, or startups, often spawn from such innovation, and lack the institutional 
memory that can lead an older firm to use outdated strategies. 
                                               
1
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Size Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here:  
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_sz_release.xls 
2
 Author’s calculation using w3schools.com’s OS Platform Statistics, available here: 
http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_os.asp  
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To effectively analyze the effects that entrepreneurship and startup creation have on 
employment, a clear definition for what constitutes a “startup” is needed.  This discussion 
defines startups as firms less than one year old3.   
 Share of Employment in Startups 
Looking at employment share at any given time, startups account for roughly ten percent 
of all firms in the United States, but only about two to three percent of the nation’s employment, 
as shown in Figures 6-9, as well as Table 14. 
 
                                               
3
 As the Firm Age Tables of the BDS are used in this discussion, and are used to identify startups, some 
startups will never appear in the tables.  As the data used in the BDS is collected annually on March 12
th
, 
any firms that are born after March 12
th
 of any year, and die before March 12
th
 of the following year 
cannot be identified. 
4
 Figures in this paragraph are the author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the 
Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
Table 1 
Source: Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
Year Number 
of 
Startups 
Number of 
Firms 
Employees 
in Startups 
Employees in 
all Firms 
Share of 
Firms that 
are Startups 
Share of 
Employment in 
Startups 
1980 451,592 3,606,747 2,504,689 74,756,283 12.5% 3.35% 
1985 509,162 3,975,823 2,942,849 80,893,756 12.8% 3.64% 
1990 480,684 4,314,053 2,927,742 92,584,375 11.1% 3.16% 
1995 513,073 4,616,894 2,976,674 98,519,583 11.1% 3.02% 
2000 481,985 4,837,344 3,101,975 112,632,348 9.96% 2.75% 
2005 549,264 5,185,639 3,412,890 115,516,387 10.6% 2.95% 
2010 389,701 4,998,059 2,435,999 111,056,541 7.80% 2.19% 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
Figure 7 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
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 Figure 9 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
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The average number of firms and average employment cannot be easily portrayed 
between all firm categories in an accurate fashion, at least in the form of the total value of all 
firms in an age category.  This is due to the lack of a steady state in the “26+” and “LEFT 
CENSORED” categories, as explained in the Data section of this discussion.  If these age 
categories are to be included independently, their inclusion must represent the most recent 
composition of the United States economy.  Given the linear expansion of the “26+” age 
category, such data can only be accurate using 2011 as the sole sample year, or sum all age 
categories that have not achieved steady state by the first year of the sample.  Figures 7 and 9 
employ a sum of all firms 16 years of age or older, to allow for 1992 to 2011 averages to be 
accurately calculated, as will be the norm for other such cases, that would be affected by 
definitional expansion or contraction in an age category, to avoid such biases.   
The reason for the inclusion of startups in this examination as a potential source and 
method for increasing employment levels in the United States is not due to the total employment 
in such firms.  This should be evident by the lesser share of total employment which this firm 
age category holds.  The data that highlights the significance of such firms is the relative size of 
their net job creation, relative to other firm age categories. 
 Share of Net Job Creation in Startups 
 Startups account for the creation of an average of 2.96 million jobs a year, if averaged 
from 1977 to 2011.  This number is marginally higher (about 20 thousand more jobs per year) if 
averaged from 2000 to 20115. 
 This is due, in part, to a definitional advantage enjoyed by the startup firm age category, 
and the statistical significance is, in part, due to the method used to arrive at the net job creation 
data.  According to the Census Bureau’s CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY for the BDS, the job 
                                               
5
 Figures in this paragraph are the author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the 
Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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creation data is “the sum of all employment gains from expanding establishments from year t–
1 to year t including establishment startups” (Business Dynamics Statistics: Overview).  
Conversely, the job destruction rate is defined as “the sum of all employment losses from 
contracting establishments from year t–1 to year t including establishments shutting down” 
(Business Dynamics Statistics: Overview).  Net job creation is the difference between these two 
measures. 
Employment for year     is zero in the case of an establishment that did not exist the 
previous year.  For such an establishment to report job destruction would imply a negative 
number of people employed at such an establishment.  Therefore, firms and establishments 
less than a year cannot report anything but positive net job creation. 
 This is a very significant share of job creation to the United States.   The 2.96 million 
annualized jobs produced in startups each year, is 77% higher than the 1977 to 2011 average 
of 1.67 million net jobs produced annually in the entire U.S. economy.  Using a more recent time 
sample, the 2000 to 2011 average of 2.98 million jobs created annually in startups is 253% 
greater than the entire U.S. economy’s average of less than 845 thousand net jobs created, 
taken over the same period.  From this two conclusions may be drawn.  First, other firm age 
categories must exist as net job destroyers in any given year.  Second, if net job creation is 
greater in startups than in the entirety of the United States economy (including contribution from 
startups) then the body of jobs contributed by other firm age categories must be, on average, 
negative, as evidenced in Figures 10 and 11.6 
                                               
6
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here:  
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls 
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Figure 10 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 
Figure 10 superimposes the net job creation present in all age categories (the “ALL” firm 
age category in the BDS) over that net job creation present solely in startups (the “0” firm age 
category in the BDS) for each year.  Figure 11 illustrates the difference between the two.  These 
figures illustrate the strength in startup job creation relative to the U.S. economy as a whole. 
The claim that net job creation in the U.S. economy is negative, on average, is true.  
From 1977 to 2011, the economy without startups lost an average of 1.3 million jobs per year.  
Without the constant bombardment of new jobs posed by startups, totaling and estimated 45.5 
million jobs lost in the 35 years for which data has been released.  Only in eight of those years 
(1977, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1995,2000, 2006, and 2011) was the aggregate net job creation of all 
non-startup firms positive.7 
 How great is the disparity between net job creation in startups and the rest of the 
economy?  From the 1977-2011 average, if the United States failed to see any startup creation 
                                               
7
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls 
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in a given year, it could expect a net loss of 1.30 million jobs that year.  But as noted above, 
perhaps due to the recent economic recession, startups have accounted for a much greater 
share of the economy in the twenty-first century: a share almost exactly twice as great.  Using 
the twenty-first century average, the U.S. economy, sans startups, would expect to lose 2.14 
million jobs.8 
 
Figure 11 
Source:  Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 Figure 12 highlights an interesting implication for the statistical significance of startups in 
U.S. job creation in relation to other firm age categories.  With the grouping of firm ages used to 
allow for the 1977 to 2011 average, the data suggests that net job creation doesn’t happen in 
any other firm age category, or at least that every other firm age category has registered net job 
destruction, or negative net job creation.  Figure 11 contrasts this finding, displaying the 2011 
net job creation in all firm age categories that were grouped into the “16+” category in Figure 10.  
                                               
8
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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Both figures highlight the tremendous share of net job creation held by startups, especially in 
comparison to net job destruction present in the “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, “6 to 10”, and “11 to 15” 
years old firm age categories.  But in the 2011 sample, the only one of the firm age categories 
bundled into the “16+” grouping  to register net job destruction was the “16-20” category, which 
lost just over 87 thousand jobs.  The other three, “21-25”, “26+”, and “LEFT CENSORED” 
cumulatively contributed 1 million jobs (78.3% from “LEFT CENSORED”), more than ten times 
the loss of jobs in the “16-20” category.9 
 
Figure 12 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 The issue of whether such a discrepancy is anomalous could be solved with better ability 
to average age categories independently, which would come only as a result of a measure in 
which the continued expansion and other transient effects of the older age categories could be 
reduced in their significance.  Such a measure can be found in the derived statistics of net job 
                                               
9
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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creation per firm, as it is independent upon number of firms (although may still be biased due to 
the large amount of time those firms “LEFT CENSORED” have had to develop and expand.) 
 It is also likely that such job loss in all years, after the first, could be explained by the 
growth patterns of firms, particularly poor firm survivability.  These issues are addressed in the 
“Firm Growth and Survival, After the First Year” section of this discussion. 
 
Figure 13 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
Given the ability to take comparative measurements without worrying about the time it 
takes for a firm age category to expand into its steady state, averages were taken over a 
number of samples, each starting from the first year a particular firm age category registered its 
first firms, and each sample terminating in the year 2011 to make sure the trends captured 
applied to the current U.S. economy.  The results, shown in Table 2, establish the U.S. 
economy to be one in which, on average, all net job creation is shouldered by the startup firm 
age category, where all other firm age aggregates, on average, destroy jobs. 
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 This claim applies only to the aggregate of firms that composes such a category, and not 
to individual firms.  Certainly a number of individual firms in all categories are creating more jobs 
than they destroy.  But as an aggregate, such is not true except in the case of startups. 
 
Table 2:  Net Job Creation per Firm 
Source: Author’s Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm 
Age Tables 
Sample 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1977-2011 6.04      
1978-2011 6.02 -0.167     
1979-2011 6.04 -0.170 -0.581    
1980-2011 6.05 -0.176 -0.594 -0.501   
1981-2011 6.06 -0.165 -0.583 -0.499 -0.480  
1982-2011 6.06 -0.156 -0.577 -0.486 -0.455 -0.406 
1983-2011 6.03 -0.153 -0.578 -0.482 -0.458 -0.412 
1988-2011 6.08 -0.192 -0.587 -0.489 -0.474 -0.422 
1993-2011 6.08 -0.265 -0.540 -0.474 -0.432 -0.417 
1998-2011 6.20 -0.398 -0.531 -0.505 -0.445 -0.472 
2003-2011 6.05 -0.672 -0.583 -0.535 -0.455 -0.477 
 
 
 
Figure 14 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
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Table 2 (cont.):  Net Job Creation per Firm 
Source: Author’s Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm 
Age Tables 
Sample 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26+ LEFT 
CENSORED 
1983-2011 -0.374     -0.276 
1988-2011 -0.393 -0.310    -0.273 
1993-2011 -0.388 -0.312 -0.267   -0.271 
1998-2011 -0.449 -0.387 -0.357 -0.322  -0.441 
2003-2011 -0.460 -0.672 -0.388 -0.326 -0.247 -0.456 
 
 
Recent Trends in the Establishment of Startups and Their Net Job Creation 
 Job creation in startups averages at 2.99 million jobs created annually.  The Firm Age 
Tables show a steady incline in the first half of the last decade, peaking at 3.55 million jobs 
created in 2006, 18.8% above our now 35-year average.  The following year, the recession 
struck, and the number of jobs provided to the U.S. economy by new firms declined.  In 2009, 
only 2.41 million jobs were supplied, marking a loss of 32%, or over one million jobs provided to 
the economy.  While in recent years this important source of job creation has started to 
strengthen once more, it is returning slowly, and as of 2011, startups were still 455 thousand 
jobs short of creating the 3 million they surpassed in 2007, and in nine of the ten years prior.  It 
remains 19.6% lower than its 2006 peak.10 
                                               
10
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls  
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Figure 15 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 
 What is to blame for this drop in potency from a tremendous source of job creation?  Is 
the decline in the hiring potential of startups?  Or is it, instead, a decline in the number of new 
firms being created? 
 Net job creation per startup, similarly to net job creation in all startups, peaked modestly 
in 2006, in the last full year of expansion before the recession.  Unlike the absolute net job 
creation measure, its decline ended much faster, bottoming out in 2007 instead.  The decline 
was also less drastic; starting at an average of 6.32 jobs created per startup, it only fell 8.4%, to 
5.8 jobs created per startup.  This measure has been almost fully recovered, and in 2011 6.21 
new jobs were created per startup.  A meager 1.7% increase is required to achieve the level of 
this measure’s 2006 peak.  The 19.6% required for the aggregate net job creation of all startups 
to reach the same peak, as well as other discrepancies in the decline and recovery of these two 
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measures suggest that the net average of jobs created per startup is not the cause of the 
decline in the net job creation of startups in the U.S.11 
 
Figure 16 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
Number of startups established each year exhibited its pre-recession peak in the same 
year as the prior two measure, with 532 thousand new firms being founded in 2006.  Afterwards, 
it fell for four subsequent years, reaching the bottom of this valley in 2010, when only 389.7 
thousand firms were founded.  Not much information is available on any recovery or double-dip 
after this point, as only one year of data is available after the end of this four year, 30% 
plummet.  Almost 20 thousand more firms were established in 2011, which could indicate the 
beginning of a recovery period.  But the increase was modest, and as of the most recent data 
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 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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available through the BDS, firm foundation levels are still only 72% of what they were before the 
recession.12 
 
Figure 17 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 The share of net job creation attributed to startups certainly makes it an inviting subject 
of any discussion regarding producing a better employment environment in the United States, 
and a qualified target of any initiatives seeking to do so.  One would first seek to restore startup 
job creation levels to pre-recession levels.  The coincident 19.6% drop in aggregate startup job 
creation and 30% drop in firm creation levels suggest that the nature of such a decline in net job 
creation is the slowing of entrepreneurial activity in the United States.  Conversely, the modest 
8.4% drop, and subsequent recovery to just 1.7% below pre-recession levels in average job 
creation per new firm states fairly succinctly that startup hiring practice and potential is not the 
factor responsible for the delayed recovery.  While encouraging the more extensive hiring in 
                                               
12
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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startups is, in the long run, a useful topic of discussion in expanding the U.S. job market, the 
more immediate are for improvement is encouraging the birth of more startups.13 
Firm Growth and Survival, After the First Year 
 While the constant creation of new firms supplies the innovation the U.S. economy 
requires in order to remain competitive, the aggregate body of such firms functions primarily as 
a sort of life support system.  While startups provide short term sustenance for the economy 
they, by definition, can only remain startups in the scope of this discussion for one year.  Thus it 
is necessary to examine growth and attrition in the body of young firms and the dynamics of 
growth in the maturing aggregate to determine how net job creation progresses in the following 
years, and if it can be made more effective.  To limit the scope of such an inquiry, “young firms” 
will be defined as those firms in the “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, and “5” firm age categories of the BDS. 
 Attrition in Young Firms 
 The net job creation figures examined thus far are attributes of the difference between 
expansion and contraction in all establishments (physical locations operated by firms) between 
years     and .  It is dependent not upon successful firms, or firms that desire growth in a 
manner that would make them successful job creators, but upon all firms, whether they are 
flourishing, static, contracting, or failing.  While the Firm Age Tables provide limited if any means 
to isolate expanding, contracting, and static firms and establishments, they do provide the 
means to determine how many firms survive, and how many perish.  This information is useful 
in at least understanding the success achieved by a year’s stock of startups, and is necessary 
to any discussion of how to maintain or continue the net job creation started by a given year’s 
aggregate of startups. 
                                               
13
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here:  
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_sz_release.xls 
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 The good news is that the risk of a firm’s removal from the aggregate decreases steadily 
in each subsequent year for which it has been in existence, at least for the first five years of its 
life.  Averaging the frequencies, from 1989 to 2010, of firms four years or younger that appear in 
the next firm age category in the subsequent year has yielded the average percent chance that 
a firm will survive each year in its early life.  By definition, attrition in the first year of a firm’s life 
cannot be very accurately calculated from the BDS, as if a firm both is born and dies before the 
first data collection date, it will not appear in the BDS.  Thus one would expect the calculated 
chance of death to be lower than that which an actual startup must face.  In spite of this, even 
the calculated risk shows that the first year is by far the most difficult for a young firm to survive.  
An average of 76.8% of firms will survive their first year.  If a firm can avoid being that nearly 
one in four of firms that fail close to immediately, then their chances of survival increase with 
time.14 
 84.9% of firms survive their second year. 
 87.5% of firms survive their third year. 
 89.0% of firms survive their fourth year. 
 90.2% of firms survive their fifth year. 
 Now what does this mean for a new batch of startups?  Each of the above rates is 
calculated using the year of risked death as a base year, but for current entrepreneurs looking 
to understand their chances of surviving to a given year from where they currently are, a base 
year of zero may be preferable.15 
 76.8% of startups survive to age one. 
 64.9% of startups survive to age two. 
                                               
14
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls 
15
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls 
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 56.8% of startups survive to age three. 
 50.6% of startups survive to age four. 
 45.7% of startups survive to age five. 
 
Figure 18 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
It is important to recognize that not all of the firms that are listed as “not surviving” are 
entirely removed as sources of employment. Firm deaths do account for some of the attrition 
presented here, and firms that undergo such a process take their share of employment with 
them to the grave.  Yet a greater number of firms fail to appear in the next year’s data than are 
accounted for entirely by firm deaths.  The difference is likely composed of mergers and 
acquisitions.  Some of these processes do not remove a firm’s share of employment from of the 
economy, yet just restructure it and add the share to that of the entity doing the purchasing.  As 
there is no way to isolate these from similar actions intended to scrap another firm for parts or 
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eliminate competition, a firm’s survival as an independent entity is the focus of this portion of the 
discussion. 
Employment Growth in the Average Existing Firm  
 But what becomes of the firms that survive as independent entities?  Do these surviving 
firms mature in a way that produces jobs?  The aggregate of all surviving and failing firms, on 
average, destroys American jobs in all age categories except for startups.  But does the 
average American firm grow after its first year?  Or is enough of the aggregate of surviving firms 
either content with its current size to cease its job creation, or even worse, could the pool of 
firms exiting the economy account for only a fraction of the net job destruction that is produced 
in older firm age categories? 
 The employment per firm metric indicates that older firms do, on average, have more 
employees, as indicated by every average shown in Table 3, as well as Figures 19.  By 
selecting one of the averages whose samples are detailed in Table 3, a portrait can be 
constructed of the pattern of growth for the average surviving firm 
 
Table 3:  Employment per Firm 
Source: Author’s Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm 
Age Tables 
Sample 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1977-2011 6.09      
1978-2011 6.07 7.87     
1979-2011 6.09 7.83 8.52    
1980-2011 6.10 7.85 8.47 9.20   
1981-2011 6.12 7.87 8.50 9.13 -0.480  
1982-2011 6.11 7.90 8.52 9.17 -0.455 10.53 
1983-2011 6.09 7.88 8.55 9.20 -0.458 10.44 
1988-2011 6.11 7.81 8.47 9.13 -0.474 10.45 
1993-2011 6.12 7.68 8.34 8.92 -0.432 10.20 
1998-2011 6.23 7.70 8.38 8.97 -0.445 10.22 
2003-2011 6.08 7.42 8.02 8.67 -0.455 10.25 
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Table 3 (cont.):  Employment per Firm 
Source: Author’s Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm 
Age Tables 
Sample 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26+ LEFT 
CENSORED 
1983-2011 12.22     74.30 
1988-2011 12.16 15.75    81.81 
1993-2011 11.99 15.23 20.43   89.92 
1998-2011 11.67 14.96 19.40 27.78  99.03 
2003-2011 11.58 13.81 18.69 24.69 39.46 107.88 
 
 Consider a theoretical surviving firm, behaving typically according to this metric in a 
universe where the 2003-2011 averages for each firm age category remain constant with time.  
Such a firm would start with just over six employees.  Such a firm experiences its greatest 
growth between the first and second time it appears in the BDS (after it appears in “0”, but 
before it appears in “1”), amounting to about 21.9% growth.  This growth slows almost 
immediately to around 8 to 9% in subsequent years.  It becomes more difficulty to track this 
growth from the BDS after the firms fifth full year (after it appears in the firm age category “5”) 
due to all categories thereafter contain firms born over a span of five separate years.  The 
employment and quantity of firms given any particular year are difficult if possible to separate 
from the combined figure provided in the BDS, and divisions according to number of years 
included in the category would likely prove inaccurate, as it is improbable that the growth 
percentages would correspond to the older firms in such a category.  All that can be provided is 
the percentage growth from the startups to the average size in each category spanning firms 
founded in multiple years.16 
 Firms 6-10 years old had 90.3% more employees than startups. 
 Firms 11-15 years old had 127% more employees than startups. 
 Firms 16-20 years old had 207% more employees than startups. 
                                               
16
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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 Firms 21-25 years old had 306% more employees than startups. 
 Firms 26+ years old had 548% more employees than startups. 
 
Figure 19 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
These growth rates are, respectively, 13.0%, 19.2%, 35.4%, 32.1%, and 59.8% when 
measured using the previous age category as a base for the percentage, in case the listed 
percentages seemed too impressive.  These are even less impressive once reminded once 
more that these are for groupings of firms born across periods of five years, or ten years in the 
case of the “26+” category.17 
Once more, the continued aging of the firms in the “LEFT CENSORED” category has 
enabled these firms to exhibit a great deal of expansion, without the entry of younger, smaller 
firms.  Those firms created just recently before the 1976 cutoff have had time to mature greatly, 
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 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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to say nothing of the older firms in this category, with birthdates that cannot be determined from 
this data.  Such firms have grown from an average of 19 employees per firm in 1977 to an 
average of 120 employees in 2011, yet this is likely due in part to the definitional inability for 
newer, smaller firms to qualify, and is of little use to the discussion of the continuation of net job 
creation in younger firms.18 
  The Effects of Firm Death on Net job Creation in Young Firms 
 The measure of net job creation, displayed above and compared across firm age 
categories, is recorded for all establishments existing in year     that would have ended the 
year in the corresponding firm age category in year  , regardless of whether or not they appear 
in the census data in year   .  This means that employment gains and losses are recorded for all 
firms and establishments that survive, are party to a merger or acquisition, or die.  Some of the 
net job destruction mentioned in the Startups section above could therefore be due to firms 
going out of business.  These firms, victims of the large amount of attrition to which young firms 
are subject, contribute nothing to the discussion of how successful young firms grow.  To 
examine the growth in net job creation provided by those firms that survive, the effects of firm 
death must be removed from the figures used to measure net job growth as firms age. 
   Job Destruction in Firm Death 
 The employment lost to firm death each year is recorded in the “Firmdeath_Emp” 
indicator in the Firm Age Tables, and the 1992 to 2011 average is displayed in Figure 20.  The 
loss of employment due to firm death is, as expected and mandated by definition, zero.  From 
age categories “1” to “5”, employment loss due to firm death decreases steadily, only to break 
that pattern and spike in the “6-10” age category, and continue its descent in the “11-15” age 
category, with the “16+” age category holding the highest levels of all.  
                                               
18
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls   
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Figure 20 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 The break in the decline after the “5” year old aggregate is to be expected, and is likely 
the result of a sampling bias regarding the different age spans covered by each category.  The 
“0” to “5” age categories, each covering firms born within one year of each other display one 
pattern of decline in employment loss, while the “6-10” and “11-15” firm age categories do 
continue it, but due to the wider timespan over which their member firms were born, their levels 
appear inflated compared to those age categories spanning a single year.  The “16+” grouping 
of firm age categories, however, contains firms born over an indefinite sample of time, and as 
such is inflated to an even greater degree by this sampling bias. 
 To correct this, averages should be taken in a similar fashion to those found in Table 2, 
detailing the number of employment lost per firm that died (a listed as the indicator 
“Firmdeath_Firms” in the BDS, uses the end year as its base year, like “Firmdeath_Emp”).  The 
results are somewhat surprising, as these averages appear somewhat static across firm age 
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categories.  According to the 2003-2011 averages, which allow for all age categories to exist in 
the sample, a firm that perishes in its first year of existence takes with it, on average, 5.38 
positions for employment.  This number grows with firm age, but does so slowly.  Firms that die 
in their second year eliminate only 13.0% more jobs than those that die in their first.  Firms that 
die in their second, third, fourth, and fifth years, eliminate 13.0%, 15.9%, 17.3%, and 25.8% 
more employment positions, respectively, than a firm that dies in its first year.  The five year age 
samples, “6-10”, “11-15”, “16-20”, and “21-25” eliminate 33.1%, 39.0%, 43.0%, and 55.1% more 
employment upon death than first year deaths.  To put these percentages in perspective, the 
most destructive deaths of any firm age category, those in the “ 26+” category destroy an 
average of 57.6% more jobs than first year death, which only amounts to an average of fewer 
than eight jobs per firm death in this category.  The only category that breaks this pattern is the 
“LEFT CENSORED” category.  As the “LEFT CENSORED” category may never contain more 
firms than it did the previous year, smaller firms cannot age into it and perish.  Thus, as time 
marches on, metrics for this category become biased due to the ancient behemoths which it 
contains.19 
                                               
19
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls  For details on the statistic and calculation of 
this figure, see Appendix C, Figure 18. 
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Figure 20 
Source:  Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 
 The finding of relatively static employment destruction due to firm death runs contrary to 
what might be expected.  Older firms are, on average, have a larger labor pool than younger 
firms, and thus should have more jobs to lose in the event of their death.  Yet firms rarely die 
while functioning at peak levels, or even at any time in which their employment levels and 
existence remain sustainable.  Instead one may imagine an average firm’s simplified life cycle 
manifesting roughly as “a bell-shaped curve with rapid net employment growth during the first 
phase, followed by stability and then a slow decline” (Kane, 2010).  The data supports this, and 
indicates that the aggregate of firms represented in a single year’s firm deaths in an older firm 
age category have been declining in years prior, and have shed most of their employment 
before the year in question.   This same finding also contrasts, but does not contradict, the trend 
in which job destruction due to firm death declines with firm age, as the number of firm deaths 
declines similarly. 
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   Remaining Net Job Creation 
 It was noted earlier in this discussion that with the firm age aggregate net job creation 
numbers, every firm age category, with the exception of startups, appeared to destroy jobs.  
This implied that only startups could create jobs, as the rest of the economy worked tirelessly to 
destroy them.  This finding, while useful when observing the effects a body of firms the same 
age would exert on the economy over the next year, is not useful to the understanding of when 
existing firms present the strongest engine of net job creation. 
 The net job destruction observed in firms age one and older does appear to be a direct 
result of firm death.  Once each firm age category’s firm death figures were added to the 
corresponding figure for net job creation, the effect was quite different from that observed in net 
job creation alone.  While the surviving firms in every non-startup age category did register at 
least one year of negative net job creation, when averaged from 1992 to 2011, positive results 
for job creation were achieved for all age segments.  No span of ages listed in Figures 12 and 
13 were periods in which employment shrank as a whole. 
 Omitting employment loss due to firm deaths, while shifting all age segments into the 
territory of positive net job creation, did not significantly change the makeup of what segments 
create the most jobs.  Firms 0 to 5 years old accounted for an average of 3.7 million jobs per 
year or 90% of the contribution of all surviving firms.  The largest contributor of all age segments 
is still, unsurprisingly, startups, responsible for 72.7% of America’s net job creation.  The 
definitional impossibility for this firm age category to display either firm death or job destruction 
in the BDS means that startups’ average annual contribution remains relatively unchanged from 
previous figures, at 2.99 million jobs.  The runner up, with a contribution over 10% the size of 
startups’ but almost 8% of all net job creation, is surviving one year old firms.  This 
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demonstrates that the growth is continued, though diminished, in surviving firms for a brief 
period after they’ve shed their status as a startup.20 
 
Figure 21 
Source: Author’s Calculations of U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, Firm Age Tables 
 This diminishes quickly, as three year old firms provide only the fifth greatest share of 
net job creation, behind the “6-10” firm age category, and falling just short of firms older than 
sixteen years.  These segments, however, enjoy their own definitional advantages, as firms in 
the “6-10” category spans a sample of firms births five times as large as any of the younger 
categories, to say nothing of the “16+” category, which contains firms borne over an indefinite 
period of time.  The oldest segment is responsible for shockingly little job creation, considering 
that it is composed of four separate firm age categories found in the BDS.  Yet this result just 
reinforces the appearance that America’s primary source of net job creation is startups, followed 
by young firms. 
                                               
20
 Author’s calculation using data from the July 2013 release of the Business Dynamics Statistics’ Firm 
Age Tables, Published by the U.S. Census Bureau, accessible here: 
http://www2.census.gov/ces/bds/firm/bds_f_age_release.xls  For details on the statistic and calculation of 
this figure, see Appendix C, Figure 19. 
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Recommendations 
The defining factor affecting the likelihood of an ambitious entrepreneur’s success in 
creating, maintaining, and expanding a new startups is access to resources.  Such critical 
resources may come in the form of financial capital, outside resources (such as support from 
“incubator” firms and business counselors), and the subject of this discussion: human capital 
(Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, New Venture Growth: A Review and Extension, 2006).  Firms 
fail when these resources are exhausted and no longer available, and are integral to 
determining how fast a firm can grow successfully.  Thus, any discussion of how to encourage 
the creation and expansion of new firms must center on how resources may be made more 
available to nascent entrepreneurs and new firms considering and in the midst of an expansion 
process. 
 If firm creation, survival, and expansion are dependent upon the accessibility of 
resources, then the role of government greatly depends on the region administered by the 
government body in question.  The necessary resources are not evenly distributed across the 
United States.  Regions with lesser accessibility to resources, such as inner cities and rural 
regions than in centers of industry like Silicon Valley (Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, New 
Venture Growth: A Review and Extension, 2006).  Certain policy that may work for some 
regions may not work for others, and government bodies administering larger regions may have 
too little attention to devote to devising unique strategies for each region and sub-region in an 
entanglement of diverse local economies.  Therefore this task requires cooperation between 
government bodies at various levels, as well as the private sector, to accomplish the task of 
stimulating employment growth in new firms. 
The Role of Federal and State Governments 
 The role of higher levels of government, such as the federal government, should be to 
create structural change to make resources cheaper and easier to distribute.  One of the 
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greatest incentivizing tools at the government’s disposal is the tax code.  Tax deductions and 
credits can be awarded to certain behaviors that are to be encouraged, or used to mitigate the 
costs and risks that might deter some from engaging in desired behaviors.  In the case of 
making financial capital more accessible to new firms, provisions should be included in the tax 
code to encourage certain investments in startups and expanding firms, as well as decrease the 
costs required for those young firms that suffer from fragile beginnings to expand their 
employment base to the levels they require. 
 Encouraging Investment in Startups 
 While the task of starting a new firm may often be possible with the financial resources 
available to an individual or team of entrepreneurs, firms that remain dependent upon such 
personal resources are of little use to the nation’s employment growth.  A firm’s growth usually 
requires a greater degree of capital than that which is available through self and personal 
connections, and growth-oriented firms must often seek help from government or private sector 
sources of investment (Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, New Venture Growth: A Review and 
Extension, 2006).  Thus it is of little surprise that a survey of startup executives in high-tech 
fields found that most startup executives believed that the editions to the federal tax code that 
could greatest ensure their immediate success were those “promoting capital formation - 
specifically, providing a tax incentive to invest in startups” (Silicon Valley Bank, 2013). 
  Current Initiatives 
 President Barack Obama’s administration is already exploring the idea of incentivizing 
venture capitalists to aid in the growth of young firms.  The factsheet for a White House initiative 
promoting support for startup growth promised that his “Administration Will Propose Permanent 
Elimination of the Capital Gains Tax on Certain Small Business Stock” (Fact Sheet: White 
House Launches "Startup America" Intiative, 2011) and that the Treasury Department would 
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“Simplify Rules for $5 Billion in Tax Credits for Private Investment in Lower-Income 
Communities” (Fact Sheet: White House Launches "Startup America" Intiative, 2011). 
  Strengthening Incentives for Investors 
 These measures can be taken further in a practical manner, particularly the elimination 
of the capital gains tax.  This tax is usually less severe than others for those who have sufficient 
capital for numerous or larger scale investments.  The tax on ordinary income usually is a 
greater detriment to the funds of wealthier venture capitalists “throughout almost the entire 
history of the United States... Today, the top rate is 15 percent for capital gains and 35 percent 
for ordinary income” (Mankiw, 2012)  The creation of a tax credit to make investment in a 
startup safer, specifically by mitigating losses in those same targeted startups may prove as a 
more effective incentive.  Summarized, a share of funds lost in a failed investment in a startup 
could be taken as a tax credit against the investor’s ordinary income.  As the risk associated 
with such an investment is diminished, investors will feel more secure in making a greater 
volume of investments. 
  Encouraging Venture Capital Syndication 
Studies of German IPOs suggest that a particular investment practice encourages 
greater growth, both financially and in employment.  Venture capital syndication in which 
multiple firms purchase equity in a subject firm, appears to influence the rate at which such a 
firm can grow (Lehmann, 2006).  While the direct financial benefit to the subject firm may not 
always be obvious, this conclusion does follow the observation that firms that firms that 
experience successful growth tend to be those with ties to a larger organization (Gilbert, 
McDougall, & Audretsch, New Venture Growth: A Review and Extension, 2006).  Syndication 
provides ties to multiple such firms, with a vested financial interest in the success of the subject.  
Thus the subject has greater access to valuable experience and vital resources than its similarly 
sized competitors. 
45 
 
The incentives to syndicate leave something to be desired.  One such incentive is 
mitigation of associated risk, as the efficiency, and therefore the investment risk, associated with 
a subject firm only becomes truly apparent after capital has been invested in the creation of a 
startup (Lehmann, 2006).  No particular benefit in stock price is associated with these 
investments, compared to those that are not syndicated (Lehmann, 2006).  The risk, and thus 
the profit, are shared among the invested firms, and may seem underwhelming depending upon 
the scale of the investment and the funds available to the venture capitalist. 
 Subsidizing Employment for Firms Working Towards Viability 
The same survey citing the capital formation incentives as the preferred edition to the tax 
code by startup executives, promotion of capital efficiency was the second most requested 
(Silicon Valley Bank, 2013).  This area of tax improvements is targeted at alleviating operations 
costs for firms, allowing for growth.  While government funds are too limited to cover operations 
funds for every firm considering an expansionary period, the nation’s employment may benefit 
from specific subsidies for firms in a very specific stage of their birth. 
 Many firms that would be beneficial to the economic state of the nation, and have 
potential to become successful employers do not see a profit for the beginning of their 
existence.  These costs of these firms might be alleviated through targeted tax credits.  These 
tax credits might particularly alleviate employment costs for firms still in which they operate at a 
loss, to benefit these firms as well as provide short term subsidies that directly impact the 
employment situation. 
The Role of Regional and Local Governments 
 Startups are subject to a “liability of smallness”, where “in the absence of growth, both 
new and small firms are confronted by a lower likelihood of survival” (Gilbert, McDougall, & 
Audretsch, New Venture Growth: A Review and Extension, 2006).  Their placement within an 
economy can be determinant in their success, both financially and as an employer.  Local 
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government officials are assigned an important role in the economic development of their local 
economies.  It falls to them to organize the business community to shape the economy in ways 
favorable to new startups, and attract startups that would be valuable to the regional economy, 
through social networking and educational events.   
 Important Attributes of Regional Economies 
 The most important step a local government can take towards encouraging startup 
creation is to educate themselves about the idiosyncrasies present within their own local and 
regional economies.  This involves achieving an understanding of those already developed firms 
and industries within the region.  Entrepreneurs will be more likely to locate to, and their projects 
will be more likely to survive in areas of the economy where growth is not threatened by 
entrenched competition, but rather supported by complementary firms and industries. 
  Local Market Volume 
Officials in local government must have an understanding of what supplies and demands 
exist in the local market.  They should work to remain informed about which communities and 
demands are saturated, and which are underserved.  New firms can be versatile means to 
create employment to address demands that are not being met.  These unmet demands could 
be based off regional need for a product or service, or more geographically defined, such as 
inner city neighborhoods which have greater unmet demand for retail, financial, and other 
services (Porter, 1997).  Firms starting in markets where demand is already met face a likely 
difficult battle against established institutions for market share, meaning less capital will remain 
for growth.  A firm’s likelihood of survival becomes affected when more than 65 competing firms 
operate within the same location (Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, New Venture Growth: A 
Review and Extension, 2006).  And even if the new firm was successful, without growth being 
affected, such success would likely come from competing away a portion of market share held 
by other firms, forcing them to adjust their own employment accordingly. 
47 
 
  Cluster-Based Development 
An understanding of the existing firms and patterns for interaction present in a regional 
economy is another key element in identifying areas of a local economy where new firms would 
thrive and contribute to the regional economy.  Ideally, one would be able to identify potential 
amid “regional clusters.”  These clusters are frameworks of companies in related fields and may 
take the form of “not only firms and suppliers but also educational institutions, specialized 
finance providers, and specialized research centers” (Porter, 1997).  There is potential for such 
firms to interact in a synergistic fashion, benefiting from the presence of other firms within the 
cluster.  If a role in the cluster is properly identified, new firms could be sustained by the cluster, 
either passively or actively, through stages of the firms expansion or other times when such a 
firm would otherwise be at risk. 
 Organizing Community Support for Startups 
 Few are better positioned to understand these trends than those involved in running the 
firms that are subject to them.  CEOs and other firm officials compete in the markets and must 
maintain an understanding of their state and direction if they are to remain in business.  The 
same applies to regional clusters.  None would better understand where there is potential for 
further development to a cluster than those involved in the operation of a member firm to that 
cluster.  These member firms have greater understanding of what inputs they require (including 
specialized labor inputs, material inputs, or finance inputs), what firms purchase their outputs, 
and where there is potential for new firms on either end of the production process. 
 It thus behooves local politicians to organize the structures that make such private sector 
expertise accessible to policy makers, nascent entrepreneurs, and all other relevant parties, as 
well as do their best to utilize the information yielded.  Community based organizations are key 
to such strategies of a city or county’s entrepreneurial development.  Important and informed 
CEOs or other business leaders in a region, if willing to build such relationships, should be 
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encouraged to regularly converse with the policy makers to whom such development is 
delegated to keep the perspective of local government current.  Regular meetings should be 
scheduled with organized committees of such leaders, and those same committees should be 
given scheduled forums with the public to discuss the area’s firm environment.  The local 
government must also prioritize social networking for those involved in these strategies for 
startup development in the region, ensuring that nascent entrepreneurs can be connected to the 
area’s business leaders to develop collect information and develop professional relationships 
that could be helpful in founding and expanding a firm.  Lastly, local governments should, once 
armed with the relevant information regarding potential development opportunities for their 
region’s cluster economies, search at home or abroad for those individuals or teams that have 
experience in creating firms of the desired nature, in the desired industry. 
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Conclusions 
 The vast majority of net job creation in the American economy is produced in young 
firms, specifically those in their first year of operation.  Such firms are fragile, as a firm’s risk of 
death is highest in its early life and decreases as firm age increases.   
This is the case for firms as an aggregate, but not necessarily for individual firms.  The 
early life fragility of firms is largely due to the small size typical of young firms.  Firms that lose 
their size are once more at risk.  This is due to a “liability of smallness” (Gilbert, McDougall, & 
Audretsch, New Venture Growth: A Review and Extension, 2006), and the decline in accessible 
resources that accompany it. 
Due to the high attrition rates in a firm’s early years, much employment is lost in firm 
deaths following firm births.  This employment loss typically outweighs whatever net job creation 
is contributed by surviving firms founded the same year. 
To refit the American employment system, one of the many approaches that must be 
considered is job creation through startups and young firms.  Of numerous objectives such an 
initiative must accomplish to be successful, two of the most important are encouraging the 
creation of new firms in appropriate economic settings, and aiding a greater share of those firms 
in their survival.   
Encouraging startup creation is important in bringing new innovation to the American 
economy.  Greater innovation and diversity in products creates greater room in the economy for 
employment, as it somewhat separates the market shares for which firms are competing.  An 
important aspect of encouraging such entrepreneurial activity is by making investment and other 
capital accessible to entrepreneurs and their new firms.  Much of this is done by incentivizing 
venture capital firms to invest in startups. 
An important piece of encouraging entrepreneurial is to create startups and attract 
entrepreneurs to economic areas where they are needed.  New firms are not useful to the issue 
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of employment if their existence serves to claim market share from existing firms and costs 
them equivalent or greater employment capacity.  Funds and efforts involved in encouraging the 
creation of startups are also wasted if the startup fails without positively affecting the economy, 
or maintaining employment levels for useful periods of time.  As such firms should be 
encouraged to start in underdeveloped markets, or as member firms of a regional cluster that 
can support them. 
By understanding the nature of firm creation and the jobs created in the process, and by 
taking action accordingly, the American economy stands the chance to remedy much of the 
deterioration in the job market.  Such initiatives must span multiple levels of government.  
Solutions must involve both legislative measures, education of the parties involved, and social 
networking efforts.  Yet if the job creation rates in the United States can be revitalized, net job 
creation in the United States will likely improve. 
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